The role of justice in any democratic society cannot be overemphasized. This is because it accelerates or slows the society in the area of proper growth and development. Hence, it is a given that justice and democracy are central ideals of a liberal political morality. Although vast bodies of literature have been devoted to each of them, their relation to each other has remained relatively under-explored. Nevertheless, contemporary liberals agree that only democratic arrangements can be just, but disagree on why democracy matters. Some believe its value is instrumental; others believe it is intrinsic. On the former view, democratic participation is not a requirement of justice but a means of discovering or implementing its demands. Democracy is intrinsically just: it is part of any plausible articulation of justice itself. This paper argues that in the presence of thin reasonable disagreement about justice, we should value democracy only instrumentally (if at all); in the presence of deep reasonable disagreement about justice, we should value it also intrinsically, as a necessary demand of justice. Since the latter type of disagreement is pervasive in real-world politics. It pays particular attention to the Nigerian society and how justice would imply an ideal democratic system.
Justice, Democracy, Ideal System, Nigeria
